

RESEARCH

Why Do Religious Fundamentalists Tend to be Prejudiced?

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Studies are reported of university students, and of their parents, that found that religious fundamentalism correlated quite highly with religious ethnocentrism, as well as with—to lesser degrees—hostility toward homosexuals and prejudice against various racial–ethnic minorities. Also, fundamentalist students reported receiving strong training in identifying with the family religion from an early age. But, by comparison, they reported virtually no stress being placed on their racial identification. It is suggested that strong, early emphasis of the family religion may reinforce Tajfel’s minimal group effect and produce a template for “us–them” discriminations that facilitates acquiring later prejudices.

We have known at least since the pioneering article by Allport and Ross (1967) that religious people *tend* to be prejudiced. This connection so surprises one that researchers have often tried to separate wheat from chaff by searching for some subset of religious persons who are distinctly unprejudiced. Allport himself (1966) argued that persons with an “intrinsic orientation” to religion fit the bill. Batson (1976) nominated those with a “quest” outlook. Each approach may have merit, but both have been hampered by weak instrumentation that renders the confusing findings on these orientations yet more inconclusive (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 151–156).

Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) in turn observed in their influential review that calling people religious just because they claim association with a church can mis-

lead one. Actually, they concluded, one finds a curvilinear relation between church attendance and prejudice among church members: nonactive affiliates tend to be relatively unprejudiced, but so do those who attend church frequently. It is the “now-and-then-ers” who supposedly give religion a bad name.

However, critiques by Hunsberger (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 1996, pp. 359–361) and by Altemeyer (1996, pp. 149–151) have pointed out that many of the studies that allegedly produced the curve in “curvilinear” mixed apples and oranges by combining nonaffiliated persons with church members, or compared only two groups instead of the three you need to establish a curvilinear relation, or used fence-jumping criteria about what is moderate versus high church attendance, or flat-out contradicted one another. I know of no author who has found fault with these critiques. So, at this point, the general finding appears plain and linear: The more one goes to church, the more likely one will be prejudiced against a variety of others. It should go without saying that many exceptions exist.

Then what *is* there about religiousness that might promote bigotry? Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) thought that religious fundamentalism might run with prejudice. Such fundamentalism was conceived as being, not so much a set of particular religious beliefs as an attitude toward whatever beliefs one held—for example, that they contain the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity. The construct is measured by a 20-item Likert-type scale balanced against response sets (e.g., “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed,” and “No single book of religious teachings contains all the important truths about life”). Such fundamentalism seems to be the way right-wing authoritarians (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996) respond to the religious impulse, and indeed scores on the Religious Fundamentalism scale typically correlate in the .70s with responses to the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale.¹

Fundamentalism scores also correlate in the .50s with attitudes toward homosexuals (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 26–27; e.g., “Homosexuals should be locked up to protect society”), and in the .20s with prejudice against a wide variety of racial–ethnic minorities measured by the Manitoba Ethnocentrism scale (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 24–25; e.g., “Black people are, by their nature, more violent and ‘primitive’ than others,” “If we don’t watch out, Asians will control our economy and we’ll be the ‘coolies,’” and “As a group, aboriginal people are naturally lazy, dishonest and lawless.” These latter correlations, statistically significant only with large samples, would chafe less were they not consistently positive.

¹Persons who score relatively high on the Religious Fundamentalism scale can be found in all the denominations represented in the populations I sample. But “Fundamentalist Protestants” (such as Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Salvation Army, Evangelicals, and Pentecostals) and Mennonites are appreciably overrepresented in the upper reaches of the distribution.

In contrast, responses to the Christian Orthodoxy scale (Fullerton & Hunsberger, 1982), which measures beliefs in formal Christian teachings (e.g., “Jesus was the divine Son of God,” and “Jesus was born of a virgin”) correlate less, and usually nonsignificantly, with prejudice against racial–ethnic groups (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 119). So, one’s creed per se does not particularly associate with such prejudice, but the attitude that one’s beliefs are the fundamentally correct, essential, inerrant ones *is* associated with bigotry.²

This article explores the possibility that the creation of religious fundamentalism often triggers a basic social process that lays a foundation for various kinds of prejudice. How do fundamentalist attitudes arise? Parents probably play a major role in most cases. Religious Fundamentalism correlates about .70 with university students’ responses to a 16-item Religious Emphasis scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997, pp. 22–23) that asks how much the family religion was stressed as they were growing up. Could such emphasis simultaneously plant the seeds for prejudice? Certainly, a religion can teach hatred toward some particular group. And emphatic citations of Leviticus 18:22 and Romans 1:26–27 probably help account for the highly significant difference between the .50s correlations found between religious fundamentalism and hostility toward homosexuals and the .20s correlations found between fundamentalism and prejudice against racial–ethnic minorities.³

But what explains the latter? Isn’t prejudice against such minorities an astonishing covariant of any religion that espouses ethical, just behavior and teaches the equality of all humanity before God? Indeed, religions often officially condemn such racial–ethnic intolerance, and many a sermon against prejudice is delivered from many a pulpit. And yet the more often people sit in the pews and hear this condemnation, the more prejudiced they seem to be. Isn’t that something of a mystery?

Part of the explanation may lay in the minimal group effect (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel discovered that if you

²This article focuses on Christian fundamentalists. But the connection between religious fundamentalism and intolerance may be widespread. In a 1992 study of Hindus, Jews and Muslims living in the Toronto area, Bruce Hunsberger and I found that scores on the Religious Fundamentalism scale correlated .42 to .65 with hostility toward homosexuals (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 161–165).

³In 1999 I added the frequently heard religious teaching, “We should hate sin, but love the sinner” to the end of the Religious Fundamentalism scale answered at the beginning of a booklet by 140 University of Manitoba introductory psychology students. Later in the booklet the students answered the Attitudes toward Homosexuals scale. I wondered if the “hate sin, love the sinner” responses of persons scoring in the top quartile of the Religious Fundamentalism scale would be reflected in their attitudes toward homosexuals. They were not. Most “High Fundamentalists” agreed—strongly in fact—that one should hate sin but love the sinner. But they nearly proved significantly *more rejecting* of homosexuals (M of 51.8) than did the few High Fundamentalists who disagreed with hating sin but loving the sinner (M of 37.7; $t = 1.70, p < .10$). And, of course, they rejected homosexuals much more than the other three quarters of the sample. They may believe in loving the sinner, but they also believe much more that homosexuals should be discriminated against and even thrown into jail. Such highly compartmentalized thinking is a hallmark of the right-wing authoritarian mind (Altemeyer, 1996, Chapters 4 and 5).

take a collection of people and arbitrarily divide them into groups, individuals will tend to favor the group to which they now belong over the “out-group”—even when they know the assignment was completely arbitrary, even when they know it will only last for minutes, and even when they have no idea who else is in which group. A certain minimal amount of ethnocentrism just comes with being in a group.

Most religious fundamentalists probably learned they belonged to their family’s religion early in life, and this identification, like the teachings of the religion itself, was probably emphasized to them. So unlike those who did not hail from such a background, their early experience with this religious “Us Versus Them” orientation could have created a stronger tendency toward discrimination than people usually develop. That is, their religious training—probably quite unwittingly—may have reinforced the natural tendency to make in-group versus out-group discriminations—and created a template for later discriminations against various “Thems.” In a similar vein, Jackson and Hunsberger (1999) argued that “Tajfel-based” social identity can promote a negative stereotype of nonreligious persons among the religious (p. 511).

We give this hypothesis two chances to fail in this article. First, we see if, in fact, religious fundamentalists actually are relatively ethnocentric when it comes to other people’s religious beliefs. And second, we see if fundamentalists report more emphasis having been placed on the family religion, *as a source of identity*, as they were growing up, than was placed on other sources of social identification, such as gender and race.

STUDY 1: INVESTIGATING RELIGIOUS ETHNOCENTRISM

By religious ethnocentrism I mean the tendency to make “Us versus Them,” “In-group versus Out-group” judgments of others on the basis of religious identification and beliefs. It can be distinguished from religious orthodoxy and religious fundamentalism, by which I mean respectively (as noted earlier) acceptance of the teachings of a particular religion, and the attitude that one’s religious beliefs contain the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity. These, in turn, can be distinguished from dogmatism, which I have defined as “relatively unchangeable, unjustified certainty” that can be found in many spheres of life (Altemeyer, 1996, Chapter 8; see also Altemeyer, in press).

Method

I began developing a measure of religious ethnocentrism in the fall of 1998, and after three studies involving altogether 837 introductory psychology students and two more studies involving 1308 of their parents, the balanced 16-item scale pre-

TABLE 1
The Religious Ethnocentrism Scale

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1. Christian prayer (and only Christian prayer) should be said in our public schools.
 2. Our country should always be a Christian country, and other beliefs should be ignored in our public institutions.
 3. I would *not* mind if my child had atheist teachers in elementary school.^a
 4. If there is a heaven, good people will go to it no matter what religion they belong to, if any.^a
 5. If an acquaintance invited me to her temple to see a ceremony such as a Bar Mitzvah or Jewish evening prayers, I would have no religious hesitation about going.^a
 6. I am appalled that tax dollars go to public television when they feature programs on evolution, pagan religions, and other unchristian topics.
 7. You can trust members of all religions equally; no one religion produces better people than any other does.^a
 8. Nonchristian religions have a lot of weird beliefs and pagan ways that Christians should avoid having any contact with.
 9. All people may be entitled to their own religious beliefs, but I don't want to associate with people whose views are quite different from my own.
 10. People who belong to different religions are probably just as nice and moral as those who belong to mine^a
 11. If a politician were an atheist, I would refuse to vote for him even if I agreed with all his other ideas.
 12. I would like my church to hold joint services with a wide variety of other religions.^a
 13. I would *not* mind at all if my son's best friends were all atheists.^a
 14. I would be against letting some other, different religion use my church for its services when we were not using it.
 15. If it were possible, I'd rather have a job where I worked with people with the same religious views I have rather than with people with different views.
 16. It would *not* bother me if my children regularly went to some other religion's "youth group" with their friends.^a
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Note. Items are answered on a -4 to +4 basis.

^aItem is worded in the contrait direction; the religiously ethnocentric response is to disagree.

sented in Table 1 was ready for use in the fall of 2000.⁴ The reader may agree that the scale solicits attitudes and behavioral intentions toward atheists and persons of "other religions." But no religion other than Christianity is named with the exception of Item 5—and in that particular case, the respondent is asked to reply strictly on a religious basis.⁵ So the scale hopefully elicits reactions to others just in terms of their religion.

⁴I began working on this project thanks to a master's thesis by Ms. Kim Eubanks at Valdosta State University in Georgia. In 1997 her supervisor, David Wasieleski, sent me results she had collected in a pilot study on the "religious insularity" of right-wing authoritarians. Their interests led elsewhere, and I took up the pursuit with Professor Wasieleski's blessing. Six of the statements in Table 1 are modifications of Ms. Eubank's items.

⁵The vast majority of the Manitobans I test were raised by parents with Christian backgrounds—although these parents may not have emphasized religion to their children at all. Less than 5% of my samples, altogether, grew up in Buddhist, Jewish, Hindu, Muslim, and so forth, homes. (And some of these were then removed from the study based on their response to a racial identification question at the very end of the survey.)

TABLE 2
Psychometric Properties of the Scales in the Fall, 2000 Student and Parent Studies

<i>Scale</i>	<i>No. of Items</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M Interitem Correlation</i>	<i>α</i>
Religious Fundamentalism					
Students	20	76.8	29.5	.38	.92
Parents	20	78.0	31.3	.36	.92
Manitoba Ethnocentrism					
Students	20	65.6	24.3	.35	.91
Parents	20	73.4	24.0	.30	.88
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals					
Students	12	31.9	18.4	.52	.92
Parents	12	38.4	19.4	.50	.92
Religious Ethnocentrism					
Students	16	51.0	22.6	.38	.91
Parents	16	55.6	22.2	.34	.89

Note. All scales are balanced against direction of wording effects. Items were answered on a -4 to +4 basis, which was converted to a 1-9 scale for protrait items, and to a 9-1 scale for contrait items.

TABLE 3
Intercorrelations in the Fall, 2000 Student and Parent Studies

	<i>Manitoba Ethnocentrism</i>	<i>Attitudes Toward Homosexuals</i>	<i>Religious Ethnocentrism</i>
Religious Fundamentalism	.25/.30	.61/.52	.82/.78
Manitoba Ethnocentrism		.53/.58	.49/.52
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals			.70/.68

Note. The first correlation is based on a sample of 371 White introductory psychology students. The second correlation was obtained from 441 of their parents.

In the fall of 2000, 371 White introductory psychology students at the University of Manitoba responded anonymously to the Religious Ethnocentrism scale in a booklet that began with the Religious Fundamentalism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998, pp. 50–51) and Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) scales. The Attitude Toward Homosexuals scale and the Manitoba Ethnocentrism scale, mentioned earlier, followed the Religious Ethnocentrism measure, along with demographic inquiries and other measures to be described later. A few weeks later, 441 parents of these students anonymously answered a similar survey booklet.

Results

Table 2 presents the psychometric data on the scales of interest here. The values for previously used instruments are quite ordinary for the populations and time involved (see Altemeyer, 2001). With regard to the newly developed Religious Ethnocentrism scale, the student mean of 51.0 fell below the “neutral” score of 80, and the parents produced a similarly tolerant 55.6. Responses to the 16 items in Table 1 intercorrelated .38 on the average among the students, and .34 among the parents, yielding alpha coefficients of reliability equal to .91 and .89 respectively. A principle axes factor analysis of each set of data produced relatively good evidence for unidimensionality. In each sample, two factors were extracted that mainly represented the pro-trait and con-trait items respectively—as usually happens with the scales involved in this study (see Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 53–54). A Promax rotation found these two factors correlated .72 in both samples, and accounted for 52% of the common variance in the student responses, and 47% of that among the parents. To a considerable extent, then, the items on the new Religious Ethnocentrism scale appear to measure one underlying thing, and I would submit that inspection of Table 1 indicates this underlying thing is religious ethnocentrism.

If that can be agreed, the correlations presented in Table 3 get to the heart of the matter. Religious Fundamentalism correlated .25 with prejudice against various racial–ethnic minorities among the students, and .30 among the parents. Fundamentalism related yet higher, as usual, with hostility toward homosexuals (.61 and .52 respectively). But it correlated higher still, .82 and .78, with Religious Ethnocentrism (*ts* of 9.1 and 10.8 respectively for the difference from the fundamentalism–homosexual correlation, $p < .0001$ in each case). So as relatively prejudiced as religious fundamentalists tend to be toward racial and ethnic minorities, and toward homosexuals, they are even *more* likely, compared with others, to make ethnocentric judgments on religious grounds.⁶

It should also be noted that the fundamentalism–religious ethnocentrism correlations of .82 and .78 reflected a solid interconnecting of the items on the two scales. In *both* samples, *all* of the Religious Fundamentalism items correlated significantly with Religious Ethnocentrism scores, and *all* of the statements in Table 1 correlated significantly with fundamentalism. So, fundamentalists distanced themselves from all the groups, in all the ways, on all of the grounds shown in Table 1.

⁶To round things out, Right-Wing Authoritarianism correlated .81/.77 with Religious Fundamentalism, .37/.46 with scores on the Manitoba Ethnocentrism scale, .66/.62 with Attitudes Toward Homosexuals, and .80/.73 with Religious Ethnocentrism. The Social Dominance Orientation scale correlated .06/.12 with fundamentalism, .62/.59 with ethnic–racial prejudice, .34/.41 with hostility toward homosexuals, .24/.34 with religious ethnocentrism, and .18/.23 with right-wing authoritarianism.

Discussion

We conducted this study to see if Religious Fundamentalism would correlate with Religious Ethnocentrism. It did, and so mightily that we have to wonder if the two scales are simply measuring the same thing. Obviously they tap a common domain involving religion. But even a correlation of .80 means a third of the variance of the tests is unshared, and not all of that would be error variance.

The content of the two scales suggests they measure different things. One collects attitudes about religious beliefs, namely, how basic, essential, inerrant, et cetera they are, while the other assesses attitudes about other people, namely, how much to separate oneself from those who hold different beliefs. This difference in content coins discriminant validity for the Religious Ethnocentrism scale. In both samples it always correlated significantly higher with racial–ethnic prejudice, and with hostility toward homosexuals, than fundamentalism did. (The smallest difference, the .70 versus the .61 with students' answers to the items about homosexuality, is significant beyond the .001 level [$t = 3.90$].)

Furthermore when one partials out religious ethnocentrism's mutual connections, fundamentalism's relations with racial–ethnic prejudice and hostility toward homosexuals get blown away; the *highest* resulting correlation equals .09 (ns), between fundamentalism and the homosexuals measure among the students. So religious ethnocentrism can statistically account for all of fundamentalism's positive connections with other prejudices. In contrast, controlling for fundamentalism's mutual relations takes a much smaller bite from religious ethnocentrism's connections; the *lowest* resulting relation equals .44, also among the students, between religious ethnocentrism and the homosexual measure.

One hesitates to embrace these findings too heartily, however. Social desirability might well have tempered statements about Blacks, Asians, aboriginals, and so on, whereas the Religious Ethnocentrism scale only names names when it comes to atheists, Christians, and Jews. But the respondents served anonymously. And right-wing authoritarianism, which is highly related to religious fundamentalism, correlates very poorly with the usual measures of social desirability, self-deception and impression management (Altemeyer, 1998, p. 81; see also Altemeyer, 1999). Furthermore, authoritarians usually do not believe their opinions about racial minorities are prejudiced (Altemeyer, 1988, pp. 187–188).

Some readers will wonder what role educational attainment played in the connections displayed in Table 3. Obviously, none among the students. Among the parents, years of formal schooling correlated $-.17$ with religious fundamentalism, $-.32$ with racial–ethnic prejudice, $-.14$ with hostility toward homosexuals, and $-.12$ with religious ethnocentrism. Partialling out common associations with education accordingly changes little. For example, the weakest relation (fundamentalism with racial–ethnic prejudice) only drops from .30 to .26, which is still significant beyond the .001 level.

STUDY 2: STUDENTS' REPORTS OF CHILDHOOD EMPHASIS ON RELIGION

The .80 relation between religious fundamentalism and rejection of others on grounds of faith may reveal something deep within fundamentalists. They tend to have their prejudices in various areas, compared with other people, but what they most distinctly care about is other people's religion. Which makes sense, of course: Many fundamentalists would probably say their religion is the most important thing in their lives. So how astonishing can it be that religious considerations play such a powerful role in their evaluations of others?

But this leads to our second question: Are fundamentalists so standoffish toward those with other religious beliefs partly because they were emphatically trained in that particular "us–them" distinction—compared with other distinctions—early in life? If so, that early emphasis could help later prejudices germinate. Did other ethnocentrisms grow stronger in fundamentalists because the natural ethnocentric spring that Tajfel (1978) discovered was wound tighter in them during childhood by their religious training?

Method

These are largish questions, and their convincing answer requires well-controlled longitudinal studies. But I thought I could at least give this hunch a chance to fail in a little study bundled with the one just described. As the 371 students in Study 1 finished their booklet of surveys, they encountered a series of questions about their early childhoods. "A lot of our identity, our sense of who we are, depends on the *ways we classify ourselves*. For example, probably the first way we learn to classify ourselves is by gender, as a girl or a boy. But some parents emphasize sex roles more than others do. And this teaching probably began long ago, as our parents may have said things to us like, "Good little girls look nice" and "Good little boys learn to kick a ball." The students were then asked to indicate, on a 0-to-6 scale, how much their parents emphasized their gender as they were growing up. Then they were asked (on a 1–9 scale) for the approximate age when they thought their gender was first emphasized to them (with "0" indicating it never was).

After this exercise in recalling gender training (which was intended to disguise the actual purpose of the study and give the respondents some experience with the response scales), the students were asked the same questions about their family religion: "How much did your parents emphasize the family's religion as being an important part of your identity when you were growing up? (*For example: 'You are a Catholic' or 'You are a Mennonite'*)." And when did this begin? Finally, the students answered similar questions about their racial identification: "How much did your parents emphasize your racial identification as being an important aspect

of your identity as you were growing up? (For example, 'You are white')" And at what age?

Results

Nearly all of the students said they recalled some gender training, and most reported some stress having been placed on a family religion, but most said their race had never been emphasized—not surprising given they are “white folk” in a predominantly white culture. Religious fundamentalists did not particularly report their gender roles being stressed ($r = .07$) nor their racial identification ($r = .09$). But they said they *had* been encouraged to identify with the family religion ($r = .39$; $p < .001$).

Moving to the central issue, did fundamentalists receive more training in their religious than in their racial identities *in absolute terms*? The 92 students who scored in the top quartile on the Religious Fundamentalism distribution posted a mean of 4.19 on the 0-to-6 “religion was emphasized” measure. But they had only a bottom-dwelling 1.10 on the “race was emphasized” item ($p < .001$).⁷ They also reported their religious identity had been stressed from an early age, with a mean of 2.7 years, compared with 3.8 years ($p < .01$) for racial identification, when it happened. But 57% of the high fundamentalists, like 62% of the rest of the sample ($p > .30$), said their parents had *never* emphasized their race as being an important part of their identity. Yet somehow fundamentalists were significantly more likely as adults to be racially prejudiced.

Discussion

This correlational study cannot tell us that religious fundamentalists tend to be prejudiced partly because their early religious training taught them to dislike “different others” in general. It could have told us there was no basis for such a hypothesis, but the basis was supported. Fundamentalists usually said their home religion was stressed as an important aspect of their identity early in life and, not surprisingly, they make stronger us–them judgments as adults when it comes to religion than most people do. Roots of their racial prejudices would be just as obvious if their racial identity had also been emphasized in childhood. But they report it was not. Yet they have a variety of racial prejudices, relative to others, and these prejudices *could* have been facilitated by an ethnocentric frame of mind laid down by their early religious training.

⁷The difference for the rest of the sample between religious emphasis ($M = 2.27$) and racial identification ($M = 0.86$) was much smaller, and significantly less ($p < .001$) so, than it was for the 92 fundamentalists.

One can drum up other interpretations of the results, however. First, these retrospective reports may be highly bogus: students' recall of how much religion and race were emphasized in their childhoods can easily be doubted. Second, social desirability or self-deception (such as a reluctance to recall early racist training) may have corrupted the results. Third, racial prejudice has many sources and some covariant of religious fundamentalism, some "third variable" such as fear of a dangerous world or self-righteousness, may lead fundamentalists to racial prejudice. Fourth, the shunning of others on religious grounds could itself spring entirely from other, later sources, such as a need to consensually validate one's beliefs (Newcomb, 1961). Fifth, even if early childhood experiences do establish a template for other ethnocentrisms, the template could easily be broken by later experiences, or be very minor in importance if it persists. And so on.

Still, the hypothesis beckons. The items on the Religious Ethnocentrism scale capture not just shunning, but hubris and rejection, disparagement and dislike. And compared with others, high scorers not only reject atheists—who have totally different beliefs from them about religion—but also persons of other faiths whose overall beliefs may be quite similar. Religious fundamentalists tend to have a very small "us" and quite a large "them" when it comes to faith. And this high level of religious ethnocentrism, learned early in life, can provide at least part of the reason why such people would incline toward in-group, out-group distinctions later: it is just response generalization. And most fetching of all, the hypothesis explains why early emphasis on a religion, and believing intensely in what it teaches, and going to church a lot ironically contribute to the prejudices that are preached against from the pulpit. Religion, most inadvertently, may provide an early ethnocentrism school—which we attend by segregating ourselves into our families' religions.

So, the hypothesis may deserve some further chances to fail. As a next step, someone with easy access to the kind of schoolchildren among whom the minimal group effect was first discovered could repeat Tajfel's experiment, and see if children raised to identify strongly with their family religion showed greater in-group, out-group discrimination than other children did. Should that prove true, one could see if such discriminations were even greater in societies undergoing significant strife between religious groups. As well, one might see if other kinds of early social identity training, involving (say) nationality or social class, also coincide with widespread ethnocentrism.

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